Secure Coherent-state Quantum Key Distribution Protocols with Efficient
  Reconciliation by Van Assche, G. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
04
10
03
1v
1 
 5
 O
ct
 2
00
4
Secure Coherent-state Quantum Key Distribution Protocols with Efficient
Reconciliation
G. Van Assche,1, ∗ S. Iblisdir,1, 2 and N. J. Cerf1
1QuIC, Ecole Polytechnique, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, CP 165/59, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
2GAP-Optique, University of Geneva, 20 rue de l’Ecole-de-Me´decine, CH-1211 Gene`ve, Switzerland
We study the equivalence between a realistic quantum key distribution protocol using coher-
ent states and homodyne detection and a formal entanglement purification protocol. Maximally-
entangled qubit pairs that one can extract in the formal protocol correspond to secret key bits in
the realistic protocol. More specifically, we define a qubit encoding scheme that allows the formal
protocol to produce more than one entangled qubit pair per coherent state, or equivalently for the
realistic protocol, more than one secret key bit. The entanglement parameters are estimated us-
ing quantum tomography. We analyze the properties of the encoding scheme and investigate its
application to the important case of the attenuation channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), also called quan-
tum cryptography, allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to
share a secret key that can be used for encrypting mes-
sages using a classical cipher, e.g., the one-time pad. The
main interest of such a key distribution scheme is that
any eavesdropping is, in principle, detectable as the laws
of quantum mechanics imply that measuring a quantum
state generally disturbs it.
The resources required by QKD comprise a source of
non-orthogonal quantum states on Alice’s side, a quan-
tum channel conveying these states to Bob, a measuring
apparatus on Bob’s side, and a (public) authenticated
classical channel between Alice and Bob. In addition to
being used to generate a secret key, the quantum channel
is subject to probing by the legitimate parties, so as to
determine how many secret bits can be generated.
Most interest in QKD has been devoted to protocols in-
volving (an approximation to) a single-photon source on
Alice’s side and a single-photon detector on Bob’s side
(see [1] and the references therein). However, protocols
involving quantum continuous variables have been con-
sidered with an increasing interest [2, 3, 4, 5]. Of special
importance are coherent-state protocols [6, 7]. The quan-
tum source at Alice’s side randomly generates coherent
states of a light mode with Gaussian-distributed quadra-
tures, and Bob’s measurements are homodyne measure-
ments. These protocols seem to allow for facilitated
implementations and higher secret-key generation rates
than the protocols involving single-photon sources [7].
Consequently, there is an increasing interest for study-
ing the security of coherent state protocols under general
classes of attacks. Individual Gaussian attacks are con-
sidered in [6, 7], and are found to be optimal in the more
general class of finite-width non-Gaussian incoherent at-
tacks [8]. Individually-probed collective attacks are also
considered in [9, 10]. The recent techniques of [11, 12] do
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not make any assumptions on the eavesdropper’s technol-
ogy and are also considered in [9, 10] for coherent state
protocols, although giving lower secret key rates.
In this paper, we study the security of a prepare-
and-measure QKD protocol [6, 7] by establishing its
equivalence to an entanglement purification (EP) pro-
tocol, which produces maximally-entangled qubit pairs.
A maximally-entangled qubit pair is by definition com-
pletely factored from its environment, and thus the val-
ues obtained by measuring each side are fully correlated
and secret. The equivalent prepare-and-measure QKD
protocol also enjoys this property. This particular tech-
nique thus allows one to relieve from any assumptions
on the eavesdropper’s strategy and was used in [13] to
assess the security of the BB84 protocol and in [3] for
a squeezed state protocol. More recently, this technique
was extended to the case of coherent state protocols [14].
To show the equivalence between a QKD protocol and
of an EP protocol, one has to explicitly take into account
the secret key distillation, that is, the techniques used to
make Alice’s and Bob’s keys equal (reconciliation) and
fully secret (privacy amplification). In [13], the EP pro-
tocol uses CSS quantum codes [15, 16], which are equiv-
alent in QKD to reconciliation with syndromes of binary
linear codes and privacy amplification by multiplication
with a parity-check matrix. In contrast to BB84, the
modulation of coherent states in the protocol we con-
sider here is continuous, therefore producing continuous
key elements from which to extract a secret key. Rec-
onciliation of a Gaussian-distributed key was studied in
[17], and a generic protocol called sliced error correction
was designed so as to distill a binary key.
In contrast to [14], the EP protocol is constructed in
such a way that it is equivalent to a QKD protocol with
sliced error correction for reconciliation. The advantage
is the higher secret key rate and the better resistance
to attenuation that one can achieve. In particular, more
than one maximally-entangled pair (or secret key bit) can
be produced per coherent state. Furthermore, thanks to
its generality, the asymptotic efficiency of the EP proto-
col inherits to some extent from the asymptotic efficiency
of the classical reconciliation protocol.
2The paper is organized as follows. First, in Sec. II, we
macroscopically describe the formal EP protocol and its
equivalent QKD protocol that are used throughout the
paper. Then, in Sec. III, we show how the channel can be
probed so as to determine the number of secret key bits
that Alice and Bob can generate. The encoding of qubits,
that is, the generalization of sliced error correction to
EP, is described in Sec. IV. Then, Sec. V deals with
the important particular case of an attenuation channel.
Finally, the asymptotic properties of the qubit encoding
scheme are detailed in Sec. VI.
II. FROM ENTANGLEMENT PURIFICATION
TO SECRET KEY DISTILLATION
After we review the case of EP using CSS codes and its
equivalence to BB84, we give a high-level description of
a QKD protocol based on EP. We consider this protocol
as formal, that is, we do not expect a physical implemen-
tation of it. Instead, we propose a prepare-and-measure
QKD protocol, derived from the formal one, which also
encompasses error correction and privacy amplification.
A. Binary CSS codes
In the case of BB84, the CSS codes can readily be used
to establish the equivalence between an EP protocol and
a QKD protocol [13]. Since we will use CSS codes as an
ingredient for the EP and QKD protocols below, let us
briefly review their properties.
Starting from the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen (EPR)
state
|φ+〉 = 2−1/2(|00〉+ |11〉), (1)
Alice keeps half of the state and sends the other half to
Bob. His part may undergo a bit error (|φ+〉 → |ψ+〉),
phase error (|φ+〉 → |φ−〉) or both errors (|φ+〉 → |ψ−〉),
with |φ−〉 = 2−1/2(|00〉 − |11〉) and |ψ±〉 = 2−1/2(|01〉 ±
|10〉). Given that not too many such errors occurs, Alice
and Bob can obtain, from many instances of such a trans-
mitted state, a smaller number of EPR pairs using only
local operations and classical communications (LOCC).
One way to do this is to use CSS codes.
Let C1 and C2 be two binary error correcting codes
of n bits (i.e., C1 and C2 are vector spaces of F
n
2 ) with
parity check matrices H1 and H2, resp. They are cho-
sen such that {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 . A CSS code is
a k-dimensional subspace of Hn, the Hilbert space of n
qubits, with k = dimC1 − dimC2 [15, 16]. The code C1
allows to correct bit errors, while C⊥2 (the dual code of
C2) allows to correct phase errors—one important prop-
erty of the CSS codes is to be able to correct bit errors
and phase errors independently.
For entanglement purification, Alice and Bob must
compare their syndromes, both for bit errors and phase
errors. The relative syndrome determines the correction
that Bob must apply to align his qubits to Alice’s. Trans-
lating this into the BB84 protocol, one can show [13] that
the relative syndrome for bit errors in the EP protocol is
equal to the relative syndrome for bit errors that Alice
and Bob would have reconciled in the BB84 protocol. So,
reconciliation can be done using the C1 code. Phase er-
rors of the EP protocol do not have such a direct equiv-
alent in the BB84 protocol: The prepare-and-measure
protocol works as if Alice measured her part of the state
in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, thereby discarding information on
the phase. However, one does not really need to correct
the phase errors in the BB84 protocol. Instead, if C⊥2
would be able to correct them in the EP protocol, the
syndrome of C2 in C1 of Alice and Bob’s bit string turns
out to be a valid secret key in the prepare-and-measure
protocol. Stated otherwise, H1 determines the syndrome
Alice has to send to Bob to perform reconciliation, while
H2 determines the way the final key is computed for pri-
vacy amplification.
Overall, the number of secret key bits is thus k =
dimC1 − dimC2, provided that C1 (resp. C⊥2 ) is small
enough to correct all the bit (resp. phase) errors. When
considering asymptotically large block sizes, the CSS
codes can produce
k = rn→ n(1− h(eb)− h(ep)) = Rn (2)
EPR pairs or secret key bits, with eb (resp. ep) the
bit (resp. phase) error rate and h(p) = −plog2p − (1 −
p)log2(1 − p) [13].
We conclude this section by noting that the bit error
rate eb determines the number of bits revealed by recon-
ciliation (asymptotically h(eb)), whereas the phase error
rate ep determines the number of bits discarded by pri-
vacy amplification due to eavesdropping (asymptotically
h(ep)).
B. Quantum key distribution based on
entanglement purification
In BB84, the modulation of qubits can be transposed
as if Alice prepares a |φ+〉 state and measures her part. In
the case of the QKD protocol with Gaussian-modulated
coherent states, the formal state that Alice prepares is of
course different, as it must reduce to the proper modula-
tion when Alice measures her part. We define the formal
state as:
|Ψ〉 =
∫
dxdp g(x, p)|x〉
a1
⊗ |p〉
a2
⊗ |x+ ip〉
b
, (3)
where g(x, p) denotes a bi-variate Gaussian distribution
g(x, p) =
√
G1(x)G2(p). The kets |x〉, |p〉, |x + ip〉
are shorthand notations for respectively a x-quadrature
eigenstate with eigenvalue x, a p-quadrature eigenstate
with eigenvalue p and a coherent state whose x mean
value equals x and whose p mean value equals p. The
3subscripts a1, a2 (resp. b) denote that the system is lying
on Alice’s side (resp. Bob’s side).
The state (3) does not have a direct physical meaning.
In particular, the systems a1 and a2 must be understood
as classical pointers, e.g., resulting from the (formal) ho-
modyne measurement of an EPR state as studied in [18].
In the entanglement purification picture, the b part of
the system is sent to Bob (and possibly attacked by Eve)
and the a part stays at Alice’s station. If Alice measures
x in a1 and p in a2, the state is projected as if Alice sent
Bob a coherent state centered on x+ ip.
Let us now describe the EP protocol, which reduces
to the prepare-and-measure QKD protocol described fur-
ther.
• Alice creates l+ n copies of the state |Ψ〉, of which
she sends the b part to Bob.
• Bob acknowledges reception of the states.
• Out of the l + n states, n will serve for estimation
purposes. These states are chosen randomly and
uniformly by Alice, who informs Bob about their
positions.
• For the remaining l states, Alice and Bob perform
entanglement purification, so as to produce rl (0 ≤
r ≤ 1) states very close to |φ+〉. Measured in the
computational bases, the produced states yield rl
secret bits on both Alice’s and Bob’s sides.
The details of the EP procedure, which uses CSS codes as
an ingredient, are given in Sec. IV, while the estimation
is detailed in Sec. III.
C. Prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution
By virtually measuring the a part of the state |Ψ〉, the
protocol above reduces to the following one.
• Alice modulates l+ n coherent states |x+ ip〉 that
she sends to Bob. The choice of the values of x and
p follow the distribution |g(x, p)|2 = G1(x)G2(p).
• Bob acknowledges reception of the states.
• Out of the l + n states, n will serve for estimation
purposes. These states are chosen randomly and
uniformly by Alice, who informs Bob about their
positions.
• For the remaining l states, Bob measures x. Alice
and Bob perform secret key distillation (reconcili-
ation and privacy amplification), so as to produce
rl secret bits.
The reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures
are based on classical error correcting codes, which derive
from the CSS codes used in the formal EP protocol.
III. ERROR RATES ESTIMATION USING
TOMOGRAPHY
In QKD protocols derived from EP, an important step
is to show how one can infer the bit and phase error rates
of the samples that compose the key. A fraction of the
samples sent by Alice to Bob are sacrificed so as to serve
as test samples. By randomly choosing them within the
stream of data, they are statistically representative of the
whole stream.
In [3, 13], one can simply make measurements and di-
rectly count the number of bit and phase errors from the
results. This is possible since Bob’s apparatus can mea-
sure both bit and phase values. In [14], however, it is not
possible to measure directly phase errors. Yet some data
post-processing can be applied on measurements so as to
infer the number of phase errors in the stream of data. In
this section, we wish to show that we can extend this to
more general (and more efficient) encodings of qubits (in
the EP picture) or bits (in the derived QKD protocol).
The encoding of bits will be described in a further
section—for the moment, the qubit pair system (i.e., one
among possibly several ones), which Alice and Bob will
process using CSS codes, is abstractly represented by its
Pauli operators acting in a1: Zs (phase flip) and Xs (bit
flip), and in b: Ze and Xe. (The subscripts s and e stand
for slice and estimator, resp., to follow the convention of
the following sections.) The bit errors are assumed to
be easy to determine, that is, Zs has a diagonal expan-
sion in |x〉
a1
〈x|, and Ze can directly be determined by
a single homodyne measurement on b. This ensures, in
the derived prepare-and-measure QKD protocol, that Al-
ice knows the bit value she sent, and Bob can determine
the received bit value. A measurement of the observable
XsIa2Xe associated to the phase error rate, however, can-
not be implemented by a single homodyne measurement
on b. Therefore, we have to invoke quantum tomography
with a quorum of operators [19] to get an estimate of the
phase error rate.
A. Estimating phase errors in the average state
In the EP picture, let ρ(n) be the state of the n sam-
ples used for estimation of the phase error rate (i.e., n
instances of the a1a2b system). To count the number of
phase errors in a set of n samples, one needs to measure
O = XsIa2Xe on the n samples and sum the results (with
Ia2 the identity in the system a2). This is equivalent to
measuring O(n) =
∑
iI
⊗i−1
a1a2b
⊗ XsIa2Xe ⊗ I⊗n−ia1a2b . If the
true phase error probability in the n + l samples is ep,
the error variance is σ21 = 2e
p(1 − ep)/n, and thus the
probability of making an estimation error of more than
∆ is [3, 13] asymptotically exp(−∆2n/4ep(1− ep)). It is
easy to see that
Tr(O(n)ρ(n)) = nTr(Oρ), (4)
4where ρ = n−1
∑
iTrAll\{i}(ρ
(n)) is the density matrix
of the average state measured. So, we can estimate the
number of phase errors using the average state, even if
eavesdropping is joint (ρ⊗n 6= ρ(n)).
If the measurement of O = XsIa2Xe cannot be made
directly, one instead looks for a quorum of operators Qλ
such that O =
∫
dλo(λ)Qλ; estimating 〈O〉 comes down
to measuring several times Qλ for values of λ chosen
randomly and independently of each other, and averaging
the results weighted by o(λ): O ≈ ∑io(λi)Qλi [19]. If
the values of λ are chosen independently of the sample
index on which Qλ is applied, we get unbiased results,
as Tr(Oρ) = Eλ[Tr(Qλρ)], with E the expectation. Of
course, the estimation of Tr(Oρ) with a quorum cannot
be perfect and an estimation variance σ22 must also be
considered and added, σ2 = σ21 + σ
2
2 .
B. Estimating phase errors using coherent states
and homodyne detection
We now explain how the phase error rate can be esti-
mated, in principle, using coherent states modulated in
both quadratures and homodyne detection in all quadra-
tures.
It is clear that the knowledge of matrix elements of
the average state ρ gives the knowledge of 〈O〉. Let ρ0 =
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| be the state that Alice and Bob would share if the
transmission was perfect. Since the a part of the system
stays at Alice’s station, we only need to learn about how
the b part of the system is affected. In the prepare-and-
measure picture, let T be the completely positive (CP)
map that maps the states sent by Alice onto the states
received by Bob, (Id⊗T )(ρ0) = ρ. In particular, let the
coherent state |x+ ip〉〈x+ ip| be mapped onto ρT (x+ ip)
and the (pseudo-)position state |x〉〈x′| be mapped onto
ρT (x, x
′). The functions ρT (x + ip) and ρT (x, x
′) are
related by the following identity:
ρT (x+ ip) ∝
∫
dx′dx′′e−(x
′−x)2/4N0−(x
′′−x)2/4N0
ei(x
′−x′′)p/2N0ρT (x
′, x′′), (5)
with N0 the variance of the vacuum fluctuations. By
setting D = x′ − x′′ and S = x′ + x′′ − 2x, we get:
ρT (x+ ip) ∝
∫
dDdSe−S
2/8N0−D
2/8N0+iDp/2N0
ρT (x + S +D, x+ S −D), (6)
which shows that ρT (x, x
′) is integrated with an invert-
ible kernel (Gaussian convolution in S, multiplication by
e−D
2/8N0 , and Fourier transform in D). So in principle,
any different CP map T ′ 6= T implies a different effect on
coherent states, ρT (x + ip) 6= ρT ′(x + ip). The modula-
tion of coherent states in both quadratures is thus crucial
for this implication being possible.
By inspecting Eq. (6), it seems that due to the factors
e−S
2/8N0 and e−D
2/8N0 , two different CP-maps T and T ′
may make ρT (x + ip) and ρT ′(x + ip) only vanishingly
different. It thus seems unlikely that Eq. (6) should allow
us to extract the coefficients ρT (x + S +D, x + S −D).
However, assuming that T depends only on a finite num-
ber of parameters, a variation of these parameters will
induce a measurable variation of ρT (x+ ip). We will now
discuss why it is reasonable to make such an assumption.
Due to the finite variance of the modulation of coherent
states, the probability of emission of a large number of
photons vanishes—this intuitively indicates that we only
need to consider the description of T for a bounded num-
ber of emitted photons. More precisely, one can consider
the emission of w joint copies of the state ρ0b = Tra(ρ0).
For w sufficiently large ρ⊗w0b can be represented in the
typical subspace Γδ(ρ0b) of dimension not greater than
2w(H(ρ0b)+δ), for any δ > 0 [20], where H(ρ) is the Von
Neumann entropy of a state ρ. The probability mass of
ρ⊗w0b outside the typical subspace can be made arbitrarily
small and does not depend on the eavesdropping strat-
egy. This means that the support for the input of T has
finite dimension, up to an arbitrarily small deviation.
The number of photons received by Bob can also be
upper bounded. Alice and Bob can first assume that
no more than nmax photons are received. This fact may
depend on a malicious eavesdropper, so Bob has to do
hypothesis testing. The test comes down to estimating
〈Π〉 with Π = ∑n>nmax |n〉〈n|. If the threshold is well
chosen so that n > nmax never occurs, we can apply the
central limit theorem and upper bound the probability
that 〈Π〉 > ǫ for any chosen ǫ > 0. The positivity of the
density matrices implies that the off-diagonal coefficients
are also bounded. We can thus now express ρT (x+ ip) as
ρT (x + ip) =
∑
n,n′≤nmax
ρT (x + ip, n, n
′)|n〉〈n′|. Note
that the test can be implemented either by explicitly
measuring the intensity of the beam (therefore requiring
an additional photodetector) or by exploiting the correla-
tion between the high intensity of the beam and the high
absolute values obtained when doing homodyne measure-
ments in all directions.
Finally, the estimation of the coefficient of |n〉〈n′|
can be done with arbitrarily small statistical error us-
ing homodyne detection in all directions [19, 21]. This
is achieved by considering the quorum of operators
(xθ)0≤θ<2pi, where xθ = cos θ x+sin θ p denotes the am-
plitude of the quadrature in direction θ. Considering a
finite combination of arbitrarily small statistical errors on
parameters also gives arbitrarily small overall statistical
error on the phase error rate.
IV. ENCODING OF MULTIPLE QUBITS IN AN
OSCILLATOR
Reconciliation and privacy amplification are integral
parts of the prepare-and-measure protocols derived from
entanglement purification protocols. In our case, we wish
5to derive a prepare-and-measure protocol with sliced er-
ror correction (SEC) [17] as reconciliation, which allows
us to obtain a higher secret key rate and a better resis-
tance to losses than in [14]. We therefore need to describe
an entanglement purification procedure that reduces to
SEC when the corresponding prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol is derived. An overview of SEC is proposed next.
A. Sliced error correction with invertible mappings
We here recall the main principles of SEC in a form
that is slightly different from the presentation in [17]. To
suit our needs, we here describe SEC in terms of invert-
ible functions giving the slices and the estimators—the
invertibility property will be required when we generalize
SEC to entanglement purification. Also, from the gener-
ality of [17], two parameters are fixed here: Binary error
correction is operated by sending syndromes of classical
linear error-correcting codes (ECC), and we momentarily
restrict ourselves to the case of scalar values.
Suppose Alice and Bob have l pairs of correlated ran-
dom variables (X1, X
′
1), . . . , (Xl, X
′
l), with Xi, X
′
i ∈ R,
i = 1 . . . l, from which they intend to extract common
bits.
First, Alice wishes to convert each of her variables
X into m bits and thereby defines m binary functions:
S1(X), . . . , Sm(X). To make the mapping invertible, she
also defines a function S¯(X) such that mapping from X
to the vector (S¯(X), S1...m(X)) is bijective. As a conven-
tion, the range of S¯(X) is [0; 1]. The mapping from R to
[0; 1]× {0, 1}m:
x→ (S¯(x), S1...m(x)) (7)
is collectively denoted as S.
Concretely, the functions Si(X) implicitly cut the real
line into intervals (see [17] for more details), whereas
S¯(X) indicates where to find X within a given interval.
Then, we can assemble the bits produced by the l ran-
dom variables X1 . . . Xl into m l-bit vectors. To each bit
vector (”slice”) Si(X1...l) = (Si(X1), . . . , Si(Xl)), is as-
sociated an ECC that Alice and Bob agreed upon. To
proceed with the correction, Alice sends the syndrome
ξbi = H
b
i Si(X1...l) to Bob over the public authenticated
channel, where Hbi is the l
b
i × l parity check matrix of the
ECC associated to slice i. Alice also sends S¯(X1...l).
Bob would like to recover S1...m(X1...l) from his knowl-
edge of X ′1...l, ξ
b
1...m and S¯(X1...l). To do so, he also con-
verts each of his variables X ′1...l into m bits, but he does
so in a consecutive manner. He tries to produce bits that
are best correlated to Alice’s and takes advantage of the
corrected bits of slices j < i before trying to estimate
the bits of slice i. In particular, to produce bits that are
best correlated to Alice’s first slice S1(X1...l), he uses a
function E1(X
′, S¯(X)), which gives his best estimate on
Alice’s corresponding bit S1(X) given the known correla-
tions between X and X ′. By applying the function E1 on
all the variables X ′1...l and S¯(X1...l), Bob is able to con-
struct a string of l bits that is equal to Alice’s up to some
error rate eb1 . Given the knowledge of ξ
b
1 and assuming
the adequacy of the ECC, Bob has enough information to
determine S1(X1...l) with high probability. Then, for slice
i > 1, he estimates Si(X1...l) using the estimator func-
tion Ei(X
′, S¯(X), β1, . . . , βi−1), where βj is the random
variable indicating Bob’s knowledge of Sj(X), so that
βj = Sj(X) with arbitrarily high probability. (Note that
the estimators can also be written as jointly working on l
samples at once: Ei(X
′
1...l, S¯(X1...l), ξ
b
1 , . . . , ξ
b
i−1), but we
will preferably use the previous notation for its simplicity
since, besides the ECC decoding, all the operations are
done on each variable X or X ′ independently.)
We also need a supplementary function to ensure
that the process on Bob’s side is described using bi-
jective functions: E¯(X ′, S¯(X), β1, . . . , βm) (or jointly
E¯(X ′1...l, S¯(X1...l), ξ
b
1 , . . . , ξ
b
m)). As a convention, the
range of E¯ is [0; 1]. E¯ is chosen so that the mapping
E defined below is invertible,
E :(s¯, s′1...m, x′)→ (s¯, s′1...m, E1(x′, s¯), . . . ,
Em(x
′, s¯, s′1...m−1), E¯(x
′, s¯, s′1...m)). (8)
Similarly to S, the functions E1...m of E cut the real
line into intervals. However, these intervals are adapted
as a function of the information sent by Alice, so as to es-
timate Alice’s bits more reliably. Like for S¯, the function
E¯ indicates where to find X ′ within an interval.
The mapping S summarizes Alice’s process of conver-
sion of her real values X into m bits (plus a continuous
component). The mapping E represents the bits (and a
continuous component) produced by Bob from his real
values X ′ and his knowledge of S¯(X) and of the syn-
dromes ξb1...m. The bits produced by the functions Ei are
not yet corrected by the ECC, even though they take as
input the corrected values of the previous slices Sj(X),
j < i. The description of the mapping E with the bits
prior to ECC correction allows us to easily express the
bit error rate between Alice’s slices and Bob’s estimators
and thereby to deduce the size of the parity matrices
of the ECCs needed for the binary correction. Simply,
we define ebi = Pr[Si(X) 6= Ei(X ′, S¯(X), S1...i−1(X))].
As the block size l → ∞, there exist ECCs with size
lbi → lh(ebi ) and arbitrarily low probability of decoding
error. The number of common (but not necessarily se-
cret) bits produced by SEC is therefore asymptotically
equal to H(S1...m(X))−
∑m
i=1h(e
b
i ) per sample [17].
The generalization of the SEC to a quantum entangle-
ment purification protocol is examined next.
B. Quantum sliced error correction
From classical binary error correcting codes, one can
construct CSS quantum codes and use them to extract
EPR pairs from noisy qubit pairs. We will now show
that, similarly, from SEC, it is possible to construct an
6FIG. 1: Schematic description of QS
encoding and decoding procedure, which when applied
on entangled quantum oscillator systems, also allows to
extract pure EPR pairs. Such a purification protocol is
formal, as it would of course be very difficult to imple-
ment in practice.
The purification uses a few quantum registers, which
we now list. Alice’s system a1 is split into m qubit sys-
tems s1...m and a continuous register s¯. On Bob’s side,
the system b is split into m qubit systems e1...m and a
continuous register e¯. He also needs m qubit registers
s
′
1...m for temporary storage. All these registers must of
course be understood per exchanged sample: As Alice
generates l copies of the state |Ψ〉, the legitimate parties
use l instances of the registers listed above.
The usual bit-flip and phase-flip operators X and Z,
resp., can be defined as acting on a specific qubit regis-
ter among the systems si and ei. E.g., Zsi is defined as
acting on si only. These operators are used by Alice and
Bob to construct the CSS codes that produce entangled
qubits, which are in turn used to produce EPR pairs in
the registers siei for i = 1 . . .m. Since each CSS code op-
erates in its own register pair, the action of one does not
interfere with the action of the other. It is thus possible
to extract more than one EPR pair |φ+〉 per state |Ψ〉.
If asymptotically efficient binary codes are used, the rate
or EPR pairs produced is R =
∑
i(1 − h(ebi ) − h(epi )),
where ebi (resp. e
p
i ) indicates the bit error rate (resp. the
phase error rate) [13].
The process that defines the content of the registers is
described next.
1. The mappings QS and QE
First, we define the unitary transformation QS:
L2(R)→ L2([0; 1])⊗H⊗m by its application on the basis
of quadrature eigenstates:
|x〉
a1
→ σ(x)|S¯(x)〉
s¯
⊗ |S1(x)〉s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Sm(x)〉sm . (9)
The states |s¯〉
s¯
, 0 ≤ s¯ ≤ 1, form an orthogonal basis of
L2([0; 1]), σ(x) = (dxS¯)
−1/2
(x) is a normalization func-
tion, and |si〉si , si ∈ {0, 1}, denotes the canonical basis
of H, the Hilbert space of a qubit. As a convention, the
system si is called slice i. The transformation QS is de-
picted in Fig. 1.
FIG. 2: Schematic description of QE and the use of the sys-
tems s′1...m
For each slice i, Alice and Bob agree on a CSS code,
defined by its parity matrices Hbi for bit error correction
and Hpi for phase error correction. For the entanglement
purification, let us assume that Alice computes the syn-
dromes of the CSS code with a quantum circuit. For
each slice, she produces lbi qubits in the state |ξbi 〉 and
lpi qubits in the state |ξpi 〉 that she sends to Bob over a
perfect quantum channel, so that the syndromes are re-
ceived without any distortion. In the entanglement pu-
rification picture, the syndromes can be transmitted over
a non-perfect channel if they are encoded using appro-
priate error correcting codes. Also, after reduction to a
prepare-and-measure protocol, this perfect transmission
is actually done over the public authenticated channel.
Alice also sends the s¯ system to Bob.
Then, the slice estimators are defined as the unitary
transformation QE from L2([0; 1]) ⊗ H⊗m ⊗ L2(R) to
L2([0; 1])⊗H⊗m ⊗H⊗m ⊗ L2([0; 1]):
|s¯〉¯
s
|s′1...m〉s′1...m |x
′〉
b
→ ǫ(x′, s¯, s′1...m)|s¯〉¯s|s′1...m〉s′1...m
⊗mi=1|Ei(x′, s¯, s′1...i−1)〉ei |E¯(x
′, s¯, s′1...m)〉e¯, (10)
where ǫ(x′, s¯, s′1...m) = (∂x′E¯)
−1/2
(x′, s¯, s′1...m) is a nor-
malization function; |x′〉
b
is a quadrature eigenstate with
x-eigenvalue x′; |ei〉ei , ei ∈ {0, 1}, denotes the canonical
basis of H; |e¯〉
e¯
, 0 ≤ e¯ ≤ 1, form an orthogonal basis of
L2([0; 1]). As the classical mapping E is invertible, QE
is unitary with the appropriate normalization function ǫ.
This mapping is defined to act on individual states, with
the slice values s′1...m as input in the system s
′
1...m, whose
purpose is actually to hold Bob’s sequentially corrected
bit values β1...m. The complete transformation jointly in-
volving l systems would be fairly heavy to describe. Only
the ECC correction needs to be described jointly, and as-
suming it is correctly sized (i.e., lbi are large enough), Bob
has enough information to reconstruct Alice’s bit values.
Let us now sketch how the system s′1...m is constructed.
Assume that Bob first calculates, using a quantum cir-
cuit, the first slice estimator (classically: E1(X
′, S¯(X))),
which does not depend on any syndrome. That is, he
applies the following mapping, defined on the bases of
s¯ and b: |s¯〉
s¯
|x′〉
b
→ |s¯〉
s¯
|E1(x′, s¯)〉e1 |E¯1(x′, s¯)〉e¯1 (up to
normalization), where the function E¯1 is needed only to
make the mapping unitary. From the l qubits in the l sys-
7tems e1 and the syndrome sent by Alice |ξb1 〉, there exists
a quantum circuit that calculates the relative syndrome
of Alice’s and Bob’s bits, that is a superposition of the
classical quantities ξb1 ⊕Hb1E1(X1...l). From this, a quan-
tum circuit calculates the coset leader of the syndrome,
that is (a superposition of) the most probable difference
vector between Alice’s and Bob’s qubits. An extra l− lb1
blank qubits are needed for this operations; we assume
they are all initialized to |0〉:
|Hb1 (s(l)1 ⊕ e(l)1 )〉
s
′(lb
1
)
1
|0〉
s
′(l−lb
1
)
1
→ |s(l)1 ⊕ e(l)1 〉s′(l)1 . (11)
Then, using a controlled-not operation between Bob’s
bits (control) and the difference vector (target), we pro-
duce l qubits containing the same bit values as Alice’s,
with an arbitrarily large probability:
|e(l)1 〉e(l)1 |s
(l)
1 ⊕ e(l)1 〉s′(l)1 → |e
(l)
1 〉e(l)1 |s
(l)
1 〉s′(l)1 . (12)
This is how the l systems s′1 are created.
Following this approach for the next slices, we
can define: |s¯〉
s¯
|s1〉s′1 |E1(x
′, s¯)〉
e1
|E¯1(x′, s¯)〉e¯1 →
|s¯〉
s¯
|s1〉s′1 |E1(x
′, s¯)〉
e1
|E2(x′, s¯, s1)e2 |E¯2(x′, s¯, s1)〉e¯2 ,
and reasonably assume that the bit value given in s′1 is
equal to Alice’s S1(X). This reasoning can be applied
iteratively, so as to fill the system s′1...m with all the
corrected bit values, and with an extra step to set
E¯(x′, s¯, s1...m) in e¯.
As a last step, Bob can revert the ECC decoding oper-
ations and come back to the situation where he has blank
qubits in s′1...m as depicted in Fig. 2.
Finally, the qubits produced byQE can be transformed
into EPR pairs using the CSS codes and the syndromes
Alice sent to Bob.
2. Phase coherence
Neither the unitary transformation QS nor QE take
into account the modulation of the coherent state in the
p-quadrature. By ignoring what happens in the a2 sys-
tem of Eq. (3), the reduced system ρa1b lacks phase co-
herence:
ρa1b =
∫
dxdx′dp
√
G1(x)G1(x′)G2(p)|x〉a1〈x′|
D(ip)|x+ i0〉
b
〈x′ + i0|D†(ip). (13)
To remedy this, we assume that Alice also sends the a2
system to Bob, just like she does for the s¯ system and the
syndromes, since the modulation in the p-quadrature is
independent of the key. Bob can take it into account
before applying QE , by displacing his state along the p-
quadrature in order to bring it on the x-axis.
Actually, we could formally include this a2-dependent
operation in the QE mapping, by adding |p〉
a2
to its in-
put and output (unmodified) and by multiplying by a
factor of the form eix
′p/4N0 in Eq. (10), with N0 the vac-
uum fluctuations. For notation simplicity, however, we
mention it here without explicitly writing it.
Also, for the simplicity of the notation in the next sec-
tion, we can assume without loss of generality that the
coefficients of |Ψ〉 in the x-basis of b are real, after ad-
justment by Bob as a function of p.
3. Construction of S¯ and E¯
Let us now make explicit the construction of the func-
tions S¯ and E¯. First assume, for simplicity, that we have
only one slice (m = 1)—for this we do not write the slice
index as a subscript. The mapping has thus the following
form:
|x〉
a1
|x′〉
b
→ σ(x)|S(x)〉
s
|S¯(x)〉
s¯
ǫ(x′, S¯(x), S(x))
|E(x′, S¯(x))〉
e
|E¯(x′, S¯(x), S(x))〉
e¯
, (14)
where σ(x) = (dxS¯)
−1/2
(x), ǫ(x′, s¯, s) =
(∂x′E¯)
−1/2
(x′, s¯, s), and S¯ and E¯ range between 0
and 1.
Let us take some state ρ of the systems s¯see¯. In
the entanglement purification picture, our goal is to
be able to extract entangled pairs in the subsystem
ρse = TrAll\{s,e}(ρ). We thus want ρ to be a product
state of the form ρse ⊗ ρs¯e¯. If S¯(X) contains information
about S(X), or if E¯(X ′, S¯(X), S(X)) contains informa-
tion about E(X ′, S¯(X)), the subsystem ρse will not be
pure. In the prepare-and-measure picture, information
on S(X) in S¯(X) will be known to Eve and therefore
may not be considered as secure. Note that information
in E¯(. . . ) is not disclosed, but since it is excluded from
the subsystems from which we wish to extract entangle-
ment (or secrecy), any correlation with e¯ will reduce the
number of entangled qubits (or secret bits); or stated oth-
erwise, the calculated number of secret bits will be done
as if E¯(. . . ) was public. As an extreme example, if S(X)
and E(X ′, S¯(X)) are perfectly correlated and if S(X) can
be found directly as a function of S¯(X), then ρse will be
of the form ρse = p0|00〉〈00|+ p1|11〉〈11|, which does not
allow us to extract any EPR pairs, or equivalently, does
not contain any secret information. Consequently, S¯ and
E¯ should be as statistically independent as possible of S
and E.
We define S¯ and E¯ as the following cumulative prob-
ability functions: S¯(x) = Pr[X ≤ x | S(X) = S(x)] and
E¯(x′, s¯, s) = Pr[X ′ ≤ x′ |S¯(X) = s¯, S(X) = s, E(X ′, s¯) =
E(x′, s¯)]. By definition, these functions are uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1, independently of the other
variables available to the party calculating it (Alice for S¯
and Bob for E¯). These functions also enjoy the property
of making the subsystem ρse pure in absence of eavesdrop-
ping (i.e., when ρ is pure), indicating that this choice of
S¯ and E¯ does not introduce more impurity in ρse than ρ
already has.
8For a pure state |ψ〉 = ∫ dxdx′f(x, x′)|x〉
a1
|x′〉
b
, with
|x〉
a1
(resp. |x′〉
b
) an x-eigenstate in a1 (resp. in b), the
application of QS and QE gives:
∑
s,e∈{0,1}
∫
ds¯de¯ σ(x)ǫ(x′, s¯, s)f(x, x′)|s〉
s
|s¯〉
s¯
|e〉
e
|e¯〉
e¯
,
(15)
where x and x′ are shorthand notations for x(s, s¯) and
x′(e, e¯, s¯) respectively. Let f1 and f2 be real and non-
negative functions verifying f(x, x′) = f1(x)f2(x, x
′).
f1(x) is chosen such that |f1(x)|2 is the probability den-
sity function of Alice’s modulation, and f2(x, x
′) such
that |f2(x, x′)|2 is the probability density function of
Bob’s measured value x′ conditionally to Alice send-
ing x. Then, it is easy to check that we can factor∑
a,b∈{0,1}αab|ab〉se out of |ψ〉 by setting:
σ(x(s, s¯)) =σ0(s)(f1(x(s, s¯)))
−1
, (16)
ǫ(s¯, x′(e, e¯, s¯), s) =ǫ0(e, s)(f2(x(s, s¯), x
′(e, e¯, s¯)))
−1
,
(17)
where
σ20(s) =
∫
x:S(x)=s
|f1(x)|2dx, (18)
ǫ20(e, s) =
∫
x,x′:S(x)=s,E(x′,S¯(x))=e
|f2(x, x′)|2dxdx′. (19)
The conclusion follows from the definition of σ and ǫ.
When more than one slice is involved, the functions S¯
and E¯ are defined similarly:
S¯(x) = Pr[X ≤ x|S1...m(X) = S1...m(x)], (20)
E¯(x′, s¯, s1...m) = Pr[X
′ ≤ x′|S¯(X) = s¯
∧ S1...m(X) = s1...m
∧ E1(X ′, s¯) = E1(x′, s¯) ∧ . . .
∧Em(X ′, s¯, s1...m−1) = Em(x′, s¯, s1...m−1)].
(21)
V. THE ATTENUATION CHANNEL
We now apply the slicing construction and display
some results on the rates one can achieve in an important
practical case. These results serve as an example and do
not imply an upper bound on the achievable rates or dis-
tances. Instead, they can be viewed as lower bounds on
an achievable secure rate in the particular case of an at-
tenuation channel with given losses. Stated otherwise,
this section simulates the rates we would obtain in a real
experiment where Alice and Bob would be connected by
an attenuation channel. For more general properties of
the construction, please refer to Sec. VI.
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we wish to
illustrate the idea of the previous section and show that it
serves realistic practical purposes. Beyond the generality
ρ1 ρ2
Losses eb1 e
p
1 R1 e
b
2 e
p
2 R2
0.0dB 3.11% 5.33% 0.752 0.0000401 0.710% 0.938
0.4dB 3.77% 13.7% 0.193 0.0000782 28.6% 0.135
0.7dB 4.32% 20.0% 0.0204 0.000125 37.5% 0.0434
1.0dB - 0.000194 42.3% 0.0147
1.4dB - 0.000335 45.6% 0.00114
FIG. 3: Error and EPR rates with two slices in an attenuation
channel
of the sliced error correction, its implementation may be
easier than it first appears. Furthermore, the purification
(resp. distillation) of more than one qubit (resp. bit) per
sample is useful, as illustrated below.
Second, it is important to show that the construction
works in a case as important as the attenuation channel.
Clearly, requesting that a QKD protocol yields a non-zero
secret key rate under all circumstances is unrealisitic—
an eavesdropper can always block the entire communi-
cation. On the other hand, a QKD protocol that would
always tell Alice and Bob that zero secure bits are avail-
able would be perfectly secure but obviously also com-
pletely useless. Of course, between these two extreme
situations, the practical efficiency of a QKD protocol is
thus important to consider.
The attenuation channel can be modeled as if Eve in-
stalled a beam-splitter in between two sections of a loss-
less line, sending vacuum at the second input. We here
assume that Alice sends coherent states with a modula-
tion variance of 31N0, with N0 the vacuum fluctuations,
which gives Alice and Bob up to I(A;B) = 2.5 common
bits in absence of losses or noise. This matches the order
of magnitude implemented in [7]. We define the slices
S1 and S2 by dividing the real axis into four equiprob-
able intervals labeled by two bits, with S1 representing
the least significant bit and S2 the most significant one.
More precisely, S1(x) = 0 when x ≤ −τ or 0 < x ≤ τ and
S1(x) = 1 otherwise, with τ =
√
2× 31N0 erf−1(1/2),
and S2(x) = 0 when x ≤ 0 and S2(x) = 1 otherwise.
In this constructed example, we wish to calculate the
theoretical secret key rate we would obtain in an identical
setting. For various loss values, the secret key rates are
evaluated by numerically calculating Tr((Zsi ⊗Zei)ρ), to
obtain the bit error rates of slices i = 1, 2 and Tr((Xsi ⊗
Xei)ρ) to obtain the phase error rates. Then, assuming
asymptotically efficient binary codes, the rate is R =
R1 +R2 =
∑
i=1,2(1− h(ebi )− h(epi )).
Using this two-slice construction, we were able to get
the EPR rates described in Fig. 3. For the case with no
losses, it is thus possible to distill R = 0.752 + 0.938 =
1.69 EPR pairs per sample. Also, note that the phase er-
ror rate increases faster with the attenuation for ρ2 than
for ρ1, with ρi = ρsiei = TrAll\{si,ei}(ρ). This intuitively
follows from the fact that the information Eve can gain
from her output of the beam splitter affects first the most
9significant bit contained in S2(X).
Due to the higher bit error rate in ρ1, it was not pos-
sible to distill EPR pairs in slice 1 with losses beyond
0.7 dB. It was however still possible to distill EPR pairs
in slice 2, up to 1.4 dB losses (about 10km with fiber
optics with losses of 0.15dB/km). This result does not
pose any fundamental limit, as it can vary with the mod-
ulation variance and with the choice of the functions S1
and S2. Note that the slice functions could be optimized
in various ways, one of which being to use other intervals
(as done in [17], not necessary equiprobable and possibly
chosen as a function of the losses), and another being to
consider multi-dimensional slices as explained in the next
section.
Finally, note that although this example involves a
Gaussian channel, this particularity is not exploited here
and such a calculation can be as easily done for a non-
Gaussian attack.
VI. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
In this section, we study the behavior of the slice con-
struction when the slice and slice estimator mappings
take as input a block of w states, with w arbitrarily large.
In [17], the classical sliced error correction is shown to re-
duce to Slepian-Wolf coding [22] (asymmetric case with
side-information) when using asymptotically large block
sizes. We here study the quantum case, which is different
at least by the fact that privacy amplification is explicitly
taken into account.
For simplicity of the notation, we will study the asymp-
totic behavior in the case of an individually-probed chan-
nel only (although Eve’s measurement can be collective).
A study of periodic probing with period much smaller
than the key size would give the same results, since in
both cases it allows us to consider a sequence of identical
random experiments and to study the typical case. How-
ever, joint attacks, with width as large as the key size,
are outside the scope of this section, as the statistical
tools presented here would not be suitable.
It is important to stress out that we here investigate
what the secret key rates would be if the actual channel
is an individually-probed one. The use of the protocol of
this paper still requires to evaluate the phase error rate
in all cases and this quantity is sufficient to determine the
number of secret key bits. In the case of joint attacks, the
secret key rates stated in the special cases below would
then differ from the one obtained using the phase error
rate.
A. Direct reconciliation
We thus here consider a block of w states and the func-
tions S, S¯, E and E¯ on blocks of w variables as well.
Among the qubits produced by QS, there is a certain
number of them whose disclosed value allows Alice and
Bob to correct (almost) all bit errors for the remaining
slices. Then, among the remaining slices, a certain num-
ber of qubits allows Alice and Bob to correct (almost) all
phase errors for the rest of the qubits. These last qubits
are thus equivalent to secret key bits in the prepare-and-
measure protocol.
We consider the following state, with the action of
the channel modeled as joining system b with that of an
eavesdropper Eve, and with p left out as a public classical
parameter:
|Ψ(p)〉 =
∫
dx g(x)|x〉
a1
|φ(x, p)〉
b,eve. (22)
We consider w such states coherently, and the mappings
QS and QE take all w states as input. We will fol-
low the lines of the reasoning in [20, 23, 24] to show
that the secret key rate tends to I(X ;X ′)− I(X ;E) for
w →∞, with X the random variable representing Alice’s
measure of a1 with x, X
′ the measure of b with x, and
I(X ;E) = H(X) + H(ρeve) − H(ρa1,eve), where H(ρ) is
the Von Neumann entropy of a state ρ. The remainder
of the discussion must be understood for any ǫ, ǫU > 0,
with w sufficiently large.
Consider a mapping U from R to a finite set U
of size 2m, for some sufficiently large m, such that
I(U(X);X ′) ≥ I(X ;X ′)− ǫU . Let S¯(X) be the remain-
ing continuous information not contained in U(X), de-
fined as in Sec. IVB3. Let x(s¯, u) be the mapping that
recovers x from S¯(x) and U(x).
We here recall some definitions from [23]. For a given
value of s¯(w) and p(w) (s¯(w), p(w) ∈ Rw), a HSW code
[20, 24] B is a subset of Uw such that the corresponding
w-wide states |φ(w)(x(w)(s¯(w), u(w)), p(w))
b(w),eve, u
(w) ∈
B, can be distinguished by Bob with probability at least
1 − ǫ. A privacy amplification (PA) set E is a subset
of Uw such that the sum of the corresponding states∑
u(w)∈E |φ(w)(x(w)(s¯(w), u(w)), p(w))〉b(w),eve factors Eve.
Finally, a key generation code B is a HSW code that
can be divided into a collection of non-overlapping PA
sets B = ∪kEk. In the sequel, we drop the w superscript
for simplicity.
Consider three consecutive ranges I = 1 . . . |I|, J =
|I|+1 . . . |I|+ |J |, K = |I|+ |J |+1 . . . |I|+ |J |+ |K| with
sizes |I| = ⌈wH(U(X)|X ′) + ǫ⌉, |J | = ⌈wI(U(X);E)⌉
and |K| = ⌊wI(U(X);X ′) − wI(U(X);E) − ǫ⌋. Note
that |I| + |J | + |K| ≤ wH(U(X)) + 2 ≤ wm + 2. These
three ranges will correspond to three kind of slices in the
derived prepare-and-measure protocol: SI , SJ and SK .
SI will give Bob enough information to perform error
correction, SJ will contain bits, equal between Alice and
Bob, which will be sacrificed with PA since they are not
necessarily secret, and SK will contain equal and secret
bits (i.e., key bits).
From [23], it is possible to cover the space of wm +
2-bit vectors with 2|I| key generation codes CsI of size
2|J|+|K|. To each element of Uw, we assign a |I|-bit vector
that identifies the key generation code it belongs to; this
defines the first |I| slices SI(X).
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By providing the bit syndromes ξbI to Bob, he can
identify SI(X) = sI and the associated key genera-
tion code CsI . By definition, he has enough infor-
mation to identify an element within it. Such an
element can be uniquely labeled by a |J | + |K|-bit
vector, thereby defining SJ and SK . So, there ex-
ists a mapping that maps |sI〉s′
I
|φ(x(s¯, u), p)〉
b,eve onto
|sI〉s′
I
|sJK〉eJK |φ′(x(s¯, u), p)〉e¯,eI, eve with probability at
least 1− ǫ, and thus ebi ≤ ǫ, ∀i ∈ J ∪K.
Each key generation code contains 2|K| PA sets of size
2|J| each [23]. The labeling can be such that SK cor-
responds to the identification of the PA set and SJ the
element inside the PA set.
Providing the phase syndromes ξpJ to Bob gives him
enough information to determine the phase of Alice’s
qubits in sJ . If the phase errors are corrected by Bob,
measuring or tracing out subsystems sJeJ is equivalent
to summing the slices in J over all possible bit values and
thus factoring out Eve. More precisely, with s¯, sI and p
fixed (and the corresponding subsystems not shown), and
with |s∗j 〉s∗
j
= 2−1/2(|0〉
sj
+(−1)s∗j |1〉
sj
) (and similarly for
ej and s
′
j), the system after correction of sI is of the form:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
sKsJ
|sJK〉sJK |0〉s′J |sJK〉eJK |φ
′(sJK)〉e¯,eI ,eve
=
∑
sKsJs∗Je
∗
J
(−1)sJ (s∗J+e∗J )|s∗J 〉s∗
J
|sK〉sK
⊗ |0〉
s′
J
|e∗J〉e∗
J
|sK〉eK |φ′(sJK)〉e¯,eI ,eve. (23)
Then Alice sends to Bob information about her phase
(s∗J ), which he stores in his auxiliary register s
′
J . The
state becomes:
∑
sKsJs∗Je
∗
J
(−1)sJ (s∗J+e∗J )|s∗J 〉s∗
J
|sK〉sK
⊗ |s∗J〉s′
J
|e∗J〉e∗
J
|sK〉eK |φ′(sJK)〉e¯,eI ,eve. (24)
The difference between Alice’s and Bob’s phases is calcu-
lated in s′J and the correction is applied to e
∗
J . Overall,
this transformation can be summarized as |s∗J 〉s′
J
|e∗J〉e∗
J
→
|s∗J + e∗J〉s′
J
|s∗J〉e∗
J
. This gives the following state:
∑
sKs∗J
|s∗J〉s∗
J
|sK〉sK |s∗J〉e∗J |sK〉eK
⊗
∑
sJ ,(s∗J+e
∗
J
)
(−1)sJ (s∗J+e∗J )|s∗J + e∗J〉s′
J
|φ′(sJK)〉e¯,eI ,eve
=
∑
sKs∗J
|s∗J 〉s∗
J
|sK〉sK |s∗J 〉e∗J |sK〉eK
⊗
∑
sJ
|sJ 〉s′∗
J
|φ′(sJK)〉e¯,eI ,eve. (25)
Finally, the sum
∑
sJ
|sJ〉s′∗
J
|φ′(sJK)〉e¯,eI ,eve factors out
Eve, by definition of a PA set.
Given the size of K, we conclude that the secret
bit rate can asymptotically come as close as desired to
I(X ;X ′) − I(X ;E). Note that in the particular case of
the attenuation channel, an evaluation of the secret key
rate can be found in [9, 10].
B. Reverse reconciliation
So far, we have always assumed that the slices apply
to Alice and the slice estimators to Bob. However, there
are some cases for which the opposite case increases the
secret bit rate [7].
Let us start again from the state |Ψ(p)〉 as in
(22), and rewrite |φ(x, p)〉
b,eve as |φ(x, p)〉b,eve =∫
dx′ f(x, p, x′)|x′〉
b
|φ(x, p, x′)〉
eve
. Let h(x′, p) be
a non-negative real function such that h2(x′, p) =∫
dx|g(x, p)f(x, p, x′)|2. Then,
|Ψ(p)〉 =
∫
dx′ h(x′, p)|x′〉
b
|φ′(x′, p)〉
a1,eve
,
with |φ′(x′, p)〉
a1,eve
=∫
dx g(x, p)f(x, p, x′)/h(x′, p)|x〉
a1
|φ(x, p, x′)〉
eve
. (26)
Thus, by applying the same argument as for direct recon-
ciliation, we can asymptotically reach I(X ;X ′)−I(X ′;E)
secret bits when QS is applied on system b and QE on
system a1. The evaluation of the secret key rate for re-
verse reconciliation can also be found in [9, 10].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the equivalence between an
EP protocol and a QKD protocol with sliced error cor-
rection for reconciliation. In the QKD protocol, Alice
sends Gaussian-modulated coherent states to Bob, who
measures the result using homodyne detection. To probe
the channel and determine the amount of entanglement
that can be transmitted through it, Bob has to make
homodyne measurements in all quadratures.
We found that the EP protocol based on sliced er-
ror correction is indeed efficient and allows its equivalent
prepare-and-measure QKD protocol to produce a secret
key which is secure against any eavesdropping strategy.
Although the qubit encoding scheme is derived from a
reconciliation protocol easily implementable in practice
[7], the main drawback of the method is the possibly
huge number of measurements to get a statistically rel-
evant estimation of the phase error rate and thus the
number of secret key bits. Yet in theory, the sample set
can be reduced to an arbitrarily small fraction of the pro-
duced key, when an arbitrarily large number of quantum
states are processed through secret key distillation.
An advantage of this method is that it can in principle
be adapted to other modulation distributions—the fact
11
that the modulation is Gaussian is not crucial. In prac-
tice, the finite range of the amplitude modulator does
not allow one to produce a real Gaussian distribution for
the prepare-and-measure protocol, and one can take this
effect explicitly into account. Also, it may be more effi-
cient to consider a modulation of coherent states along a
uniform distribution over a finite domain of (x, p) (e.g.,
a square or a circle centered on (0, 0)) so as to increase
the correlations between Alice and Bob.
Open problems for further research include the im-
provement of the statistical estimation of the EP param-
eters, the investigation of other modulation distributions
and the optimization of the encoding scheme for practical
implementations.
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